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Merging
Merging two individuals, or two copies of a dividual together to make a single mentality with two sets of memories
In neurotechnology, merging is the theory and practice of merging the mindstates of two (or more) different sophonts so that they can function afterwards as a single entity. In many cases, the sophonts who are involved in such a merge are copies of the same original entity, so they usually share many characteristics and memories, especially memories of events that occurred before the copying occurred. While aioids or virtual sophonts can be copied almost trivially if there is enough computing power and space, and embodied sophonts can also be copied thanks to uploading, even merging two versions of a sophont with many shared memories and characteristics is non-trivial.
As two copies diverge, their mental structures become increasingly different and there is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between their minds. Just averaging them together or overlaying one neural net on the others does not create a viable person. The longer two instances of a single dividual are separated, the more new memories are created, and the personality and prejudices of each version may become significantly divergent. In some cases, different copies have become unsympathetic to one another's hopes, dreams and aspirations, and may even become enemies (see the Copy war of Eric Holsta). But copies who are unsympathetic to one another rarely desire to be merged (although this can be achieved, given a sufficiently skilful specialist in the process of merging).
The problem is even more acute when trying to merge two sophonts who are not copies of one another. Merging sophonts who have no common memories and no shared history is extremely challenging, and is generally only attempted by transapient-level specialists in this kind of process. Indeed, successful merges of any kind are best performed by transapient-level specialists (or above).
Archailect-level entities on the other hand find the merging and integration of modosophont minds a relatively trivial task, and an archailect may contain billions or trillions of merged modosophont minds of various kinds, as well as large numbers of stored inactive mindstates ready to be consulted whenever necessary. However, not all archailects retain such data, and some have very little interaction with modosophonts of any kind.
After co-existing within a single group mind for some time, the two personalities will (in most cases) integrate in one way or another. However, since modosophont neurotechnology is significantly less reliable than transapientech, in some cases the resultant merged individual may become disturbed or psychotic, requiring post-merging therapy or even memory deletion.
However a subject who subscribes to Continuity Identity Theory (CIT) is much less willing to believe in the authenticity of a copied mindstate. In CIT, the sophont's mind must remain in the original substrate, and processes such as Destructive Uploading definitely result in the death of the original. Even processes such as Gradual Uploading simply result in the creation of a new individual with no existential connection with the original mind.
However some adherents to CIT are prepared to accept that a new individual created using non-destructive uploading is a valid but separate entity, and in some cases they will choose to upload a copy of their mindstate in order to perpetuate important memories and abilities, even if they do not consider the copy to be a continuation of themselves.
In some, relatively rare cases, a subject who subscribes to CIT will decide to merge with another sophont's mindstate, perhaps to access that person's memories of important and interesting events, and to understand another's point of view more closely. In most cases the CIT believer will choose to share an exoself or exocortex with the other individual, so that they can share experiences and memories but still remain separate. Indeed, the formation of a so-called copy group, where the members of the group are all copies or simulations of each other, is an option that quite frequently includes at least one member who is a CIT believer, or has become one at some point.
In order to merge two or more biological minds without destroying them completely, some bionts choose to undergo radical medical procedures to distribute various segments of their living brain tissue between different bodies, or combine two or more minds into a single body. A body with two heads, or a single head with multiple well-connected hemispheres, are among the options available.
An arbitrary number of biont brains can be linked together into a group mind via DNI linkage, and these linked minds can exert control over a single body, or several. Over time, the members of a copy group or group mind of this kind will often develop closer bonds, which may lead to an eventual true merger via mindplexing.
This sort of biological merging is far from commonplace or popular among CIT adherents, despite resulting in a new individual with significant continuity within the components. However, some bionts happily support a number of different mind/brain complexes within their body, and members of the Laughter Hegemony often do so.
 Image from Keith Wigdor and Bing Image Creator |
In neurotechnology, merging is the theory and practice of merging the mindstates of two (or more) different sophonts so that they can function afterwards as a single entity. In many cases, the sophonts who are involved in such a merge are copies of the same original entity, so they usually share many characteristics and memories, especially memories of events that occurred before the copying occurred. While aioids or virtual sophonts can be copied almost trivially if there is enough computing power and space, and embodied sophonts can also be copied thanks to uploading, even merging two versions of a sophont with many shared memories and characteristics is non-trivial.
As two copies diverge, their mental structures become increasingly different and there is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between their minds. Just averaging them together or overlaying one neural net on the others does not create a viable person. The longer two instances of a single dividual are separated, the more new memories are created, and the personality and prejudices of each version may become significantly divergent. In some cases, different copies have become unsympathetic to one another's hopes, dreams and aspirations, and may even become enemies (see the Copy war of Eric Holsta). But copies who are unsympathetic to one another rarely desire to be merged (although this can be achieved, given a sufficiently skilful specialist in the process of merging).
The problem is even more acute when trying to merge two sophonts who are not copies of one another. Merging sophonts who have no common memories and no shared history is extremely challenging, and is generally only attempted by transapient-level specialists in this kind of process. Indeed, successful merges of any kind are best performed by transapient-level specialists (or above).
Transapientech Mindplexes
To successfully merge two (or more) personalities, a merging agent (known as a mindplex) must examine the entire mindstate, including memories, skillsets and biological characteristics (if any), of both sophonts and integrate them by composing a new, merged version which includes all relevant data. Specialist merging agents of various kinds can be found throughout the Cyberian Network, on Fata Morgana, and a number of Keterist, TRHN and NoCoZo worlds. Most mindplexes are at least S:1 transapients, although some transavant entities are capable of this kind of work.Archailect-level entities on the other hand find the merging and integration of modosophont minds a relatively trivial task, and an archailect may contain billions or trillions of merged modosophont minds of various kinds, as well as large numbers of stored inactive mindstates ready to be consulted whenever necessary. However, not all archailects retain such data, and some have very little interaction with modosophonts of any kind.
Less reliable methods of merging
Modosophont-tech-level merging using ultratech or hitech mindplex systems can be relatively successful; the subjects are both linked to comprehensive exoself expansions via DNI, and these exoselves combine with each other to sort through and integrate the two personalities and memory-complexes. These agents can now tag each memory and personality trait with distinctive markers, which allows the merged personality to quickly establish which memories, and which opinions, belong to each original. This avoids the problems associated with having two sets of memories covering the same time period.After co-existing within a single group mind for some time, the two personalities will (in most cases) integrate in one way or another. However, since modosophont neurotechnology is significantly less reliable than transapientech, in some cases the resultant merged individual may become disturbed or psychotic, requiring post-merging therapy or even memory deletion.
 Image from Bernd Helfert |
Merging according to Pattern Identity and Continuity Identity theories
Most uploading and copying processes entail the replication of the data within the subject's mindstate, and if the subject is a believer in the Pattern Identity Theory (PIT), then the subject believes that both the original and the copy are both authentic versions of each other, even if they exist in different substrates. In PIT belief, if both versions are subsequently conscious and active, the individual 'forks' into two (or more) separate instances. At some point in the future these forks may be seamlessly merged back into a single entity (assuming transapient-level mindplexing is available) or integrated less efficiently (using modotech). PIT believers who undergo merging typically believe that as long as data or memories from all merged entities are preserved through the merge, all of their consciousnesses subjectively continue in the single new being. However, some PIT believers avoid merges, as the number of separate loci of consciousness decreases in the process, and they feel this to be a form of death. In any of these cases the resulting dividuals or individuals are all authentic personalities, even if they are fundamentally different from each other.However a subject who subscribes to Continuity Identity Theory (CIT) is much less willing to believe in the authenticity of a copied mindstate. In CIT, the sophont's mind must remain in the original substrate, and processes such as Destructive Uploading definitely result in the death of the original. Even processes such as Gradual Uploading simply result in the creation of a new individual with no existential connection with the original mind.
However some adherents to CIT are prepared to accept that a new individual created using non-destructive uploading is a valid but separate entity, and in some cases they will choose to upload a copy of their mindstate in order to perpetuate important memories and abilities, even if they do not consider the copy to be a continuation of themselves.
In some, relatively rare cases, a subject who subscribes to CIT will decide to merge with another sophont's mindstate, perhaps to access that person's memories of important and interesting events, and to understand another's point of view more closely. In most cases the CIT believer will choose to share an exoself or exocortex with the other individual, so that they can share experiences and memories but still remain separate. Indeed, the formation of a so-called copy group, where the members of the group are all copies or simulations of each other, is an option that quite frequently includes at least one member who is a CIT believer, or has become one at some point.
In order to merge two or more biological minds without destroying them completely, some bionts choose to undergo radical medical procedures to distribute various segments of their living brain tissue between different bodies, or combine two or more minds into a single body. A body with two heads, or a single head with multiple well-connected hemispheres, are among the options available.
 Image from Steve Bowers | |
| Joe-Jim Arkinsonn, a biologically merged pair of individuals with a shared exoself and joint control over a single body. Neurotechnological linkage between their four cerebral hemispheres allow these two personalities to act as one, although they could be separated into different bodies with relative ease. | |
This sort of biological merging is far from commonplace or popular among CIT adherents, despite resulting in a new individual with significant continuity within the components. However, some bionts happily support a number of different mind/brain complexes within their body, and members of the Laughter Hegemony often do so.
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Development Notes
Text by Anders Sandberg, updated by Steve Bowers 2024
Additional material by ProxCenBound
Initially published on 08 December 2001.
Additional material by ProxCenBound
Initially published on 08 December 2001.
